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Abstract
I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market
using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden in-
formation I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder’s
risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was ex-
cluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder’s
traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance compa-
nies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop
a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus
experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with
previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identifica-
tion of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time
spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim
and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved het-
erogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is
controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard
in the Colombian insurance market.
JEL Classification: D82, G22, C41, C14.
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1 Introduction
Several theoretical models show that asymmetric information generates inefficiencies in
insurance markets. However the existence of such asymmetry in real life markets is a
controversial issue. In this paper I test the presence of hidden information and action in
the automobile insurance market using data sets from several Colombian insurers.
Former empirical studies test the presence of asymmetric information in form of ad-
verse selection or moral hazard searching for a positive correlation between the policy-
holders’ experienced risk and their insurance demand. The so–called positive correlation
test confound the source of asymmetric information since correlation is uninformative on
causality. Thus, following Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976) the presence of hidden informa-
tion on risk type induces a positive correlation between risk and insurance demand and
causality runs from the former to the latter. On the contrary, following Shavell (1979)
under moral hazard there exists a positive correlation between insurance demand and
experienced risk with causality running in the opposite direction. The empirical methods
employed here take into account the identification problem posted above through com-
paring the behavior implied by the presence of each source of asymmetric information
with policyholder’s observed conduct.
To identify the presence of hidden information I use the method proposed by Finkel-
stein & Poterba (2006) for UK’s annuity market. The test is based on the idea that under
symmetric information there should not exist common knowledge variables providing
information on policyholder’s risk type that also explain both his experienced risk and
insurance demand and that were excluded from pricing contracts. The existence of at
least one variable filling previous conditions provide grounds to sustain the presence of
asymmetrically used information configuring the phenomena of policyholders holding pri-
vate information on their risk type or adverse selection. Here I use traffic offenses as the
unused observable that identifies adverse selection. I find evidence of adverse selection
in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed suggesting that of-
fenses should be included in their pricing mechanism in order to reduce the informational
asymmetry and improve risk allocations.
For the identification of hidden action I extract a testable implication of moral hazard
from a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with
a bonus experience rating scheme.1 The testable implication states that the occurrence of
1 Bonus and bonus–malus are insurance market mechanisms designed to take into account policyholder’s
claim record. Thus, in a bonus–malus scheme, if in the previous year the policyholder was involved (resp. not)
1
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a claim launch prevention incentives reducing accident probabilities and the need to file
claims, a result closely related to the one found in Abbring, Chiappori & Pinquet (2003).
In econometric terms the testable implication propose that under the presence of moral
hazard the time spans between claims are increasing in previous claims causing negative
state dependence in the claim process. However, the existence of unobserved heterogene-
ity can mislead the test’s results through positive dynamic selection effects that confound
the negative state dependence effect. For instance, assume the presence of a costly rec-
ognizable driving characteristic randomly distributed among the population that affects
accident probability. Such characteristic cannot be changed over time neither it is affected
by driving experience. Therefore in terms of such characteristic high–risk policyholders
are accident–prone at anytime and the observed claim process reflects dynamic selection
effects caused by unobserved heterogeneity. I use a flexible parametric model that allows
for both occurrence dependence and unobserved heterogeneity, in order to account for
the testable implication and to solve the deceiving problem respectively. I find strong
evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implica-
tion. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled I find conclusive statistical grounds
supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.
Notice that from the theoretical point of view nothing prevents an agent from suffering
of both hidden information and action. Such overlap of problems appears as asymmetric
information in the positive correlation test but it will be undistinguishable in the indi-
vidual tests because of their specific nature. Indeed, the rejection of the null hypothesis
of symmetric information, no presence of hidden information or action (resp.), only al-
low conclusions of symmetrically imperfect information instead of ensure the presence of
hidden action of information (resp.).
The data set used here is provided by the federation of Colombian insurers Fasecolda
and contains information on insurance market covering car damage, theft and legal liabil-
ity where eleven companies provide 236,582 contracts that were signed on 2006 and then
renewed during the next year. Data base contains information on policyholder’s details
as well as their car’s characteristics together with a record of traffic offenses.
The structure of this thesis is the following. The next section presents a brief review
of the related literature. The third section describes the Colombian car insurance market
and presents the used data set. Sections four and five are devoted to the identification of
hidden information and action respectively. The last section concludes.
in a claim, his next year’s risk premium increases (resp. decreases) in a common known percentage.
2
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2 Related Literature
The following section is divided in three parts: the first and second ones review the theory
of hidden information and action respectively and their effects on the insurance market
while the third section focuses on the empirical works testing previous theoretical find-
ings. Since the objective in this paper is foremost empirical, the emphasis of the theoretical
review is put on report on the main intuitions underlying the empirical tests.
2.1 The Theory of Hidden Information
Hidden information appears in insurance markets when policyholders have information
that affect the risk insured but that remain unknown to the insurer. A prevalent conflict
arises because high–risk policyholders have no incentives to reveal his risk type since
that revelation increases his premium. As pointed out by Akerlof (1970) in the lemons
market and Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976) for the insurance market, the presence of hid-
den information impairs efficiency and may shut down the market. Many authors pro-
pose mechanisms to reduce the inefficiencies associated with adverse selection; Dionne,
Doherty & Fombaron (2001) suggest three main classes of mechanisms: (i) self–selection
mechanisms (Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976), Wilson (1977), Miyazaki (1977)); (ii) risks cat-
egorization (Crocker & Snow (1985)); and (iii) multi–period contracts (Cooper & Hayes
(1987), Dionne & Lasserre (1985), Dionne & Doherty (1994), Fombaron (2000)).
Since the empirical test of adverse selection is based on the models describing self–
selection and risk categorization I focus the attention on their seminal work. Rothschild
& Stiglitz (1976) develop a model of competitive insurance market with hidden informa-
tion on expected loss and investigate market equilibria. In a two stage game, uninformed
insurers offer a menu of contracts in the first stage and in the second the informed poli-
cyholders self–select themselves among offered contracts. Authors assume that insurers
know the proportions of bad and good risks in the population but cannot identify such
characteristic individually. Provided the competitive environment, authors assume that
firms reactions take as given the other’s offers. The main conclusions are that the only
possible Nash outcome is a separating equilibrium that may fail to exist and if it does it is
not necessarily a second–best outcome.
Together with self–selection mechanisms, risk categorization provides explanation of
insurance contracts in the static framework. Risk categorization (or statistical discrimina-
tion in terms of Dahlby (1983)) appears when risk segments are defined by an observable
3
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variable. Crocker & Snow (1985) analyze that contractual strategy and show that costless
imperfect categorization enhances market efficiency if used variables are correlated with
hidden information.
Previous contractual strategies suggest that the presence of hidden information in-
duces high–risk policyholders to demand more insurance and because of their risk status
to be accident–prone. Furthermore, risk categorization provides a clear intuition behind
the empirical test implemented here to test the existence of hidden information. Thus,
if the unused variable is correlated with hidden information then its inclusion into the
pricing mechanism reduces the effect of asymmetric information through a better risk
categorization of policyholders.
2.2 The Theory of Hidden Action
Hidden action arises in insurance markets because insurers offer contracts contingent to
the occurrence of a claim, however they cannot observe policyholders’effort and thus
write effort–contingent contracts. Once established the conflict between the principal and
the agent (the more coverage the former offers, the lower effort in prevention by the latter),
there exists the classical trade–off between risk–bearing and incentives posted by Arnott
& Stiglitz (1991). Several articles deal with hidden action on insurance markets: Shavell
(1979) treats single–period insurance markets while Rubinstein & Yaari (1983) treat dy-
namical issues.
On the effects of static hidden action on the insurance market, Shavell (1979) shows
that as long as insurers cannot observe actions taken by policyholders their incentives
to prevent loss are distorted. As a solution to this agency problem Shavell proposes in-
surance contracts with deductible in order to increase prevention effort. In terms of the
empirical test, the presence of moral hazard suggest that once the insurance contract is
acquired the prevention effort is reduced which increases risk.
Rubinstein & Yaari (1983) address the effects of dynamic hidden action on the insur-
ance market using a multi–period principal–agent model that explains the existence of
experience rating schemes. They find that one period contracts do not hold incentive com-
patibility thus policyholders always exert less prevention effort than the social desirable
and hence the first–best is not enforceable. However, authors also show that repetition of
isolated spot contracts allow reward strategies that may generate reputational effects that
enforce in the long run a social optimal level of care in every period.2 The existence of
2 In some of the theoretical literature a no–claims discount strategy is used to describe an experience rating
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such reward strategies (or contracts with bonus–malus) induces a characteristic behavior
under moral hazard: once a claim is occurred the prevention effort increases and a reduc-
tion subsequent in claims is observed. I exploit that intuition in the empirical test of the
presence of hidden action.
2.3 The Empirical Tests
Former empirical analysis on contract theory used the so–called positive correlation test to
assess the presence of asymmetric information within the insurance market.3 As pointed
out before, the positive correlation test is informative on the presence of asymmetric in-
formation but is uninformative on causality and therefore it cannot differentiate hidden
information from hidden action. First, under the presence of hidden information on risk,
high–risk policyholders demand more coverage that low-risk ones and the former realize
more claims than the latter generating a positive correlation between coverage choice and
experienced risk with causality running from revealed risk to insurance demand. Second,
if there exist hidden action, coverage from insurance reduces the cost to the insured’s bad
outcome inducing less prevention effort which increases accident risk. There is also a
positive correlation between coverage and experienced accident risk but this time with
the opposite causality.
A canonical positive correlation estimation uses two reduced–form econometric equa-
tions, one for the insurance coverage named c, and the other for the experienced risk of
loss l. In both equations the explanatory variables are the information of policyholder i
used for pricing by the insurance company named Xi. Linear versions of both economet-
ric equations are displayed below:
ci = Xiβ + ei, (1a)
li = Xiλ + µi. (1b)
Under the null of hypothesis of symmetric information the residuals of those equations
are uncorrelated. Otherwise, a statistical significant positive correlation implies the pres-
ence of information not taken into account by the pricing mechanism that affects both
coverage decision and risk and leads to a rejection of the symmetric information hypoth-
esis.
scheme.
3 See Chiappori (2001), Chiappori & Salanie´ (2003) and Cohen & Siegelman (2009) for two complete sur-
veys on empirical contract theory.
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The findings of the positive correlation approach within the automobile insurance
market are mixed: while Puelz & Snow (1994) and Cohen (2005) find evidence supporting
the presence of asymmetric information, Chiappori & Salanie´ (2000), Dionne, Gourie´roux
& Vanasse (2001) and Chiappori, Jullien, Salanie´ & Salanie´ (2006) cannot reject the null
hypothesis of symmetric information.
The work of Puelz & Snow (1994) develops a system of hedonic premium and demand
equations for a local company in USA and find evidence supporting the presence of ad-
verse selection, a result that is the focus of several critics. First, as argued by Chiappori
& Salanie´ (2000) and Dionne, Gourie´roux & Vanasse (2001), the highly constrained linear
forms used and the lack of individual information suggest an omitted variable bias.4 Sec-
ond, Puelz & Snow use data of different individuals from the point of view of the insurer
and the econometrician and do not control such heterogeneity leading to heteroscedastic-
ity problems that again bias the estimation. Finally, the records of accidents are common
information to the contract but they are treated as private information in the econometric
analysis. Altogether that problems causes bias with unknown direction nor measure on
the level of adverse selection.
Aware of the difficulties of separating adverse selection and moral hazard, Chiappori
& Salanie´ (2000) address the presence of asymmetric information testing for a positive
correlation between coverage and experienced risk and find no evidence supporting the
rejection of the hypothesis of symmetric information. Authors use information on young
drivers which circumvent both the identification and the learning problems though also
is their major drawback because the harsh sample selection.5
In addition to the identification problem, Finkelstein & Poterba (2006) and Chiappori
et al. (2006) question the robustness of the correlation approach. If individuals have dif-
ferent risk preferences, the correlation between ei and µi cannot longer be attributed only
to unobserved differences in loss risk. For instance, suppose that individuals have private
information on their risk type Z1, and on their risk aversion Z2, it is possible to write the
4 Indeed, using the same data set Dionne, Gourie´roux & Vanasse (2001) find that controlling the accident
probability breaks down the adverse selection evidence.
5 Selecting the sample on young drivers eliminates two main problems: (i) contracts with high coverage
are bought by high–risk costumers (prediction valid only for contracts within the same menu i.e., for obser-
vationally identical agents); and (ii) focusing on young drivers eliminates the possibility of learning effects
derived from driving experience.
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following equations for the residuals of (1a) and (1b) respectively:
ei = Z1,ipi1 + Z2,ipi2 + ε i, (2a)
µi = Z1,iρ1 + Z2,iρ2 + νi. (2b)
If risk aversion is positively correlated with insurance coverage but has a negative corre-
lation with risk of loss i.e., pi2 > 0 and ρ2 < 0, the correlation between ei and µi can be
zero or negative, even under the presence of asymmetric information on risk type.
The theoretical and empirical relevance of individual attitudes toward risk within in-
surance markets were recently corroborated. Chiappori et al. (2006) argue through a theo-
retical model that under the presence of private information on risk preferences, the cor-
relation test may fail to reject the null of symmetric information despite the presence of
private information on risk type. From the empirical point of view, Cohen & Einav (2005)
find that asymmetric information on risk preferences is positively correlated with private
information on risk type which reinforces the positive correlation between coverage and
ex–post risk.
2.3.1 Adverse selection and unused observables
Finkelstein & Poterba (2006) test the presence of adverse selection within the UK annuity
market and reject symmetric information using the test of unused observables i.e., variables
observed by both parts of the contract related with both risk experience and insurance
demand but not used by the pricing mechanism. The unused observable test has two major
characteristics: (i) it is able to distinguish hidden information from hidden action; and (ii)
it is robust to heterogeneity in individual preference parameters influencing insurance
demand such as risk aversion.
The empirical strategy is based on the idea that under symmetric information, the
pricing mechanism takes into account all the observed variables that provide information
relevant to the insurance contract. Otherwise, informative observed variables are wasted
and the error terms of (1a) and (1b) contain information on the policyholder’s risk–type
that were ignored by the pricing mechanism. The method of unused variables may be
formalized as follows. Letting W be the unused variable, the econometric equations are
for insurance coverage and risk of loss are:
ci = Xiβ +Wiα + e′i , (3a)
li = Xiλ +Wiφ + µ′i. (3b)
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The test’s null hypothesis of symmetric information is that both α and φ are equal to zero.
Rejecting the tests’ null hypothesis means that there is evidence supporting the presence
of asymmetric information. Moreover, the test provides evidence of adverse selection
(or identifies adverse selection from moral hazard) if there exists a positive correlation
between risk type and the unused variable for individuals with differential insurance cov-
erage. Hence distinguishing adverse selection from moral hazard is based on the avail-
ability of information on how risk and unused observable characteristics are related among
individuals regardless of their insurance coverage. Following Finkelstein & Poterba (2006)
I test the presence of adverse selection proving as unused observable policyholders’ traffic
offenses providing both external an internal evidence of the link between offenses and
accidents.
2.3.2 Moral hazard and the experience rating mechanism
The method used to identify moral hazard is based on the idea that under hidden ac-
tion on effort and the existence of experience rating schemes the occurrence of a claim
changes completely the discounted cost of future accidents making them more expensive
and implying a reaction in policyholder’s prevention behavior.
Abbring et al. (2003) propose the former empirical work implementing this method-
ology. They develop a theoretical model of dynamic moral hazard under bonus–malus
experience rating and prove that under conventional assumptions the experience rating
scheme affects the policyholder’s behavior: the occurrence of a claim induces more pre-
vention effort reducing the probability of accident and in turn claim’s intensity. They use
this testable prediction on data form a French insurer and find no significant evidence
of moral hazard. Abbring, Chiappori & Zavadil (2007) propose a similar test for moral
hazard based on the time span of a policyholder on an experience rating class. Authors
find some evidence supporting the existence of moral hazard using data from a Dutch
insurance company.
Following Abbring et al. (2003) I propose a theoretical dynamic model of moral hazard
and prove that under a bonus mechanism the occurrence of a claim changes the prevention
incentives reducing accident probability. I modify the environment proposed by Abbring
et al. to adjust the market practice in Colombia where the experience rating scheme is
based only on bonus rather than bonus–malus devices. Using a new data set I develop an
empirical model of the time span between the purchase of the insurance contract and the
first claim, and between the first claim and the second one, and so on. Thus I estimate
8
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a mixed proportional hazards model using as covariate the number of previous claims.
This model accounts the misleading unobserved heterogeneity by including a shared frailty
device that is related to random–effects models.6
3 Colombian Car Insurance Market
In the present section I briefly describe the functioning of the Colombian car insurance
market and then I describe the used data set.
Two markets provide products of car insurance in Colombia. One market offers com-
pulsory insurance covering from first to third party physical injury liability. The other
market, where data set comes from, offers insurance contracts covering car damage (total
or partial), car theft (total or partial) and legal liability. The latter market is not com-
pulsory and every policyholder chooses his coverage level and type (any combination
between total or partial damage, total or partial theft and legal liability is allowed). Dur-
ing the sample period, where eleven insurance companies provided approximately one
million of policies, insurance companies used a common knowledge bonus experience
rating scheme. Such no–claims discount device does not obey to an agreement between
insurance companies, and yet it is a generalized market practice.
Fasecolda, the federation of Colombian insurers grants access to the administrative
records of insurance companies which contains information on signed contracts. Each
record includes policyholders and their cars’ characteristics used for pricing, the amounts
of coverage, deductible and premium contracted. The data set also contains information
on the sample period claims record. Finally, the personal identification number of each
insured provides a link to the traffic offenses database that contains information on the
date, the punishable behavior and the pecuniary payment charged after an offense. I col-
lect offenses information from three years before the purchase of the contract in the data
base in order to build a consistent record of driving behavior. Table 2 on Appendix A
contains a brief description of the variables available in the data set. As long as compa-
nies have pricing mechanisms based on different variables they do not collect the same
information and some variables are available for some contracts while others are not. In-
formation on the pricing variables is private and two of the eleven companies refused to
6 For a detailed explanation of the methodology see: van den Berg (2001), Gutierrez (2002), Cameron &
Trivedi (2005, Ch. 17–19) and Kleinbaum & Klein (2005, Ch. 5)
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provide it. Table 3 in Appendix A presents variables used for pricing purposes by each
insurance company whom revealed me that information.
I observe information on insurance contracts signed in a period of two years starting
on January 1 2006. Observations are the flow of contracts written or renewed during the
first sample year that were renewed in the next. This sample design ensures that the
policyholder faces the effects of experience rating scheme on his premium schedule and
therefore the second observed year provides no additional information and it is dropped.7
Descriptive statistics of the survival data set are displayed in Table 4 on Appendix A and
reveals that 236.582 subjects enter into the study with mean entry date July 12 of 2006.
Information on subjects does not suffer from gaps in the time of the study and in total
policyholders were 86’352.430 days at risk. Every subject stayed in the study 365 days
and together made 12.894 claims with mean number of claims equal to 0,05 claims per
subject.
The initial database suffers from different attrition sources that reduce its size from
one million to 236.582 contracts. The attrition sources are the following. First, collective
contracts are a market practice in Colombia, however contract theory used here works
at the individual level instead of collective level, hence I drop joint policies taking away
almost 60% of the initial contracts. Second, insurance contracts bought by firms are identi-
fied in the database by firm identification number, however traffic offenses are charged to
the individuals involved in the offense, hence those policies cannot be linked to traffic of-
fenses. Thus policies bought by firms are discarded causing a loss of 25% of the remaining
contracts. Finally insurance contracts covering cars used for public service are discarded
provided their greater exposure to risk when compared to private used cars. This attrition
takes 8% of the remaining contracts.
Colombian transit law punishes with pecuniary payments 96 different types of driver’s
behavior with a system that does not include memory of traffic offenses like demerit point
systems. In order to solve the multidimensional issue arising from the diversity of traffic
offenses I propose two variables that condensate such information: (i) the number of of-
fenses imposed to a policyholder; and (ii) the number of minimum wages charged after
an offense. Both variables increase with offenses but the second accounts for the fault’s
severity, is steeper and more dispersed. Figures 1 and 2 on Appendix A respectively de-
pict the distribution of the number of offenses and minimum wages charged by insurance
7 In the best scenario a contract is signed in the first sample year, were not altered and renewed without
changes during the next year. Now, if a contract were signed during the first year and changed during it, I
observe the contract since it change.
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company. The distribution of traffic offenses variables is stable between insurers, depends
on their market share and is highly concentrated in zero.
4 Identification of Hidden Information
I apply the unused variable test on Colombian vehicle insurance market using traffic of-
fenses variables. In order to assess the presence of adverse selection the unused observable
have to be positively correlated with risk and be a good predictor of both experienced risk
and insurance demand. In the following section I discuss the offenses variables and assess
the correlation between offenses and accidents. Then I test the predictive power of poli-
cyholder’s traffic offenses on both experienced risk and insurance demand conditional in
both cases on pricing characteristics.
4.1 Testing Traffic Offenses as an Unused Observable
The unused variables test is able to distinguish between adverse selection and moral haz-
ard if exist evidence supporting a relationship between the unused variable and driver’s
risk type for agents with differential coverage. In the following paragraphs I provide both
external and internal evidence supporting such relationship.
A substantial body of empirical evidence suggests a relationship between traffic of-
fenses and accident rates.8 Those works test the predictive properties of offenses records
on accidents for sample populations with differential coverage. There are two poten-
tial explanations for the positive correlation between offenses and accidents: (i) causality
runs from offenses, which are correlated with unobserved characteristics, to accidents;
and (ii) risky behavior induced by insurance coverage expose the policyholder to both
offenses and accidents. The second explanation is sustained by the presence of moral
hazard and requires changes in prevention behavior conditional on owning an insurance
contract. However, with an extended traffic offenses database containing individuals with
and without insurance coverage I find a significative positive correlation between offenses
and accidents for both insurance status showing that offenses are correlated with risk and
8 This evidence includes Coppin, McBride & Peck (1971), Burg (1975), Peck & Kuan (1983), Boyer, Dionne
& Vanasse (2001), Gebers & Peck (1994), Chen, Cooper & Pinili (1995), Gebers (1998), Gebers (1999), Gebers
& Peck (2003), between others.
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suggesting that the explanation for that correlation is not the presence of moral hazard.
Table 5 on Appendix B provides the results of such estimations.
4.1.1 Traffic offenses and policyholder accident rate
In the automobile insurance context the risk of loss is defined to be the risk of filing a
claim. To analyze the relationship between the unused observables and the claim patterns,
I estimate a proportional hazards model of the time span between the purchase of an
insurance contract and the occurrence of a claim. The estimating equation is given by (4)
below:
h(t|Xi) = h0(t) exp(Xiβ), (4)
where h(t|Xi) denotes the hazard function for the probability that a policyholder with
characteristics X files a claim t periods after the purchase of the policy.
To estimate 4 I apply the Cox proportional hazards method that allows to estimate
parameters on β without imposing any parametric assumption on the form of the base-
line hazard function h0(t). The covariates of interest are insured’s characteristics used in
pricing and the variable proposed to be the unused observable.
Notice that policyholders can report various claims during a contract year thus the
estimation method should take into account the possible correlation structure behind the
failure process.9 Estimation techniques under the name of multiple failure or recurrent
event survival analysis deal with the violation of the assumption in classical survival
analysis that failure times are independent. Provided that multiple claim events possess
a natural order –the first claim, the second claim and so on, I adopt here the counting
process approach of Andersen & Gill (1982) where the problem reduces to the analysis
of time to the first event, time to the second and so on. Moreover, I use the modification
proposed by Prentice, Williams & Peterson (1981) known as the conditional risk set model
where a policyholder is not at risk of a second claim until he files the first one, and so on.
Tables 6 to 14 on Appendix B present the results after estimating a Cox model for each
insurer. Column (1) shows the results controlling only for the variables used in pricing
while columns (2) and (3) show the results after estimating a model adding as covariates
the number of offenses and the number of minimum wages charged respectively. For
simplicity, tables present only the estimated coefficients of car’s model and the unused
9 Car insurance differs for example from annuity markets where the failure process posses a state from
which an agent will never leave (the death of the insured).
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variables though complete estimation tables are available upon request. Each estimation
is followed by the number of subjects and fails that entered in the study, the log likelihood
and the pseudo–R squared statistics, the statistic of likelihood–ratio test and its probabil-
ity. Finally I present the statistics of the test of the proportional hazards assumption based
on Schoenfeld residuals.
I find a significative positive correlation between the number of offenses and the ex-
perienced risk conditional on characteristics used in pricing for six insurance companies:
101, 161, 351, 431, 451 and 501 (Table 1 below or Columns (2) of Tables 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14
on Appendix B). The effect of one–offense increase in the number of offenses increases
the hazard of filing a claim in a range of 9% (Company 451) to 24% (Company 351) show-
ing the importance of the number of offenses in predicting the experienced risk. I also
find significative evidence of positive correlation between the number of minimum wages
charged and experienced risk for five insurance companies: 101, 161, 351, 451 and 501
(Table 1 below or Columns (3) of Tables 6, 7, 9, 13, 14 on Appendix B). The effects of one–
minimum wage increase in the number of minimum wages charged increases in a modest
amount the hazard of filing a claim, the range of increase is between 0.1% (Company 351)
and 1% (Company 501). Altogether, the models are overall significant and respects the
proportional hazards assumption measured by the LR–test and the Shoenfeld residuals
statistic respectively.
Table 1: Summary of hidden information models
Company
101 161 311 351 381 431 441 451 501
Number of offenses
Cox 1,15* 1,19* 0,96 1,25* 1,05 1,12- 1,04 2,51* 1,17*
OLS 0,24* 0,01* 0,01- 0,02* 0,01+ 0,02* 0,01+ 0,01 0,01-
Number of minimum wages
Cox 1,01* 1,01* 1 1,01* 1 1 1 1,01* 1,01*
OLS 0,0013* 0,0005* 0,0009+ 0,0014* 0,0005 0,0010* 0,0003 0,0009- 0,0006-
Note: Summary table of results of the unused variable test. Cox coefficients correspond to
hazard ratios. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-)
respectively. For estimation details see Tables 6 to 14 on Appendix B.
4.1.2 Traffic offenses and coverage
Once the relationship between traffic offenses and survival rates were stated, the next step
in the unused variables test is to assess the relationship between insurance demand and
offenses conditional on observables used in pricing. Together with previous results, sta-
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tistical evidence on the latter relationship provides evidence supporting the presence of
adverse selection in the sense of Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976): informed high–risk agents,
self–select themselves by choosing comprehensive coverage contracts and hence a posi-
tive relationship between offenses and coverage controlled by the pricing variables pro-
vides evidence of adverse selection.
In order to assess such relationship I estimate an OLS model of log–coverage against
pricing and offenses variables. The estimating equation is displayed below:
ci = Xiβ +Wiα + e′i , (5)
where Wi stands for the unused observable. Tables 6 to 14 on Appendix B reports results
of that estimations for each insurer. Column (4) shows the results when the covariates are
the pricing variables while columns (5) and (6) show the results after estimating models
adding offenses variables as covariates. Again tables present only the estimated coeffi-
cients of the model of car and the unused variables though complete estimation tables are
available upon request. Each estimation is accompanied by the number of observations,
the log likelihood statistic, the adjusted–R squared and the overall significance test.
I find significant though modest evidence on the relationship between insurance de-
mand and the number of offenses for all insurance companies except for Company 451
for which I find no evidence of such relationship. The effect of one–offense increase in the
number of offenses lies in a range of 1% to 2% increases in the demand for coverage. The
results for the minimum wages charged variable are even more modest though statisti-
cally significant for seven of the nine companies for whom the test is conduced: 101, 161,
311, 351, 431, 451 and 501 (Table 1 above or Columns (6) of Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14 or
Table 1 (summary) all on Appendix B).
The important finding that traffic offenses variables are correlated with insurance de-
mand for all the insurance companies together with the earlier finding of a link between
these characteristics and claim rates constitutes a rejection of the null hypothesis of sym-
metric information. More importantly, the evidence of a relationship between offenses
variables and accidents across differential insurance coverage allows conclusion for the
presence of adverse selection in the companies for which the symmetric information hy-
pothesis has been rejected. Hence conclusions of the presence of adverse selection are
reduced to six companies: 101, 161, 351, 431, 451 and 501 (Table 1 above or Tables 6, 7, 9,
11, 13, 14 on Appendix B).
A caveat in the estimation method arises if unused observables are correlated with
pricing variables. I test that possibility by using an OLS regression of offenses against
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pricing variables for each insurer and then performing the unused test with the predicted
values of that regression. I find no differences in the test’s results and the reason for that
is the little association between offenses and pricing variables in the linear model. Test for
specification were conducted and revealed no important problems of misspecification.
5 Identification of Hidden Action
The following section tests the presence of hidden action. I derive a testable implication
of the existence of hidden action from a dynamic model of moral hazard under a bonus
experience rating scheme and then I develop an econometric model that tests the previous
implication.
5.1 Dynamic Moral Hazard under a Bonus Scheme
In the following section I propose a dynamic model of moral hazard under a bonus scheme
of experience rating and derive a testable implication that identify the presence of hidden
action. It is worth noticing that the following model and its conclusions are highly related
to Abbring et al. (2003).
5.1.1 The model
Time takes place discretely on T = {0, . . . , T}with T positive and finite. The wealth of an
agent i at time t is noted by wi,t which is strictly positive for every t ∈ T . Wealth cannot
be transferred from one period to the next i.e., there are no saving or banking devices. An
agent has an accident in t with probability pi,t, such probability depends on the agent’s
effort in accident prevention. I assume that pi,t(ei,t) is twice differentiable with p′i,t(·) < 0
and p′′i,t(·) > 0, therefore investments in accident prevention reduce accident probability
with decreasing returns. If an accident occurs, the agent incurs in a monetary loss covered
by an insurance policy with fixed deductible di and premium qi,t.10 Under a bonus scheme
10 As long as accidents not caused by the agent are completely covered and have no impact on his future
premiums i.e., the experience rating scheme does not apply, such accidents are disregarded in the econometric
analysis.
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of experience rating, the premium depends on past experience following the path:
qi,t+1 =
δqi,t if no accident occurred at tγqi,t if an accident occurred at t, (6)
where 0 < δ < 1 and γ = 1.
Hidden action is available to the policyholder, so at each time t, the agent chooses
his effort in accident prevention ei,t ∈ [0, e¯i] at a disutility cost ci(ei,t), with c′i(·) > 0 and
c
′′
i (·) > 0, thus, increases in prevention effort are costly and every effort increase has an
even higher cost. Agent’s expected utility at time t is given by:
vi(ei,t, qi,t) = pi,t(ei,t)ui(wi,t − di − qi,t) + (1− pi,t(ei,t))ui(wi,t − qi,t)− ci(ei,t), (7)
where ui(·) is increasing and strictly concave, capturing the policyholders’ risk aversion. I
assume for simplicity that utility is separable between income and cost of effort in accident
prevention in spite of its restrictiveness. This assumption is widespread in the literature.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the agent perfectly foresees his income path, thus
he is only concerned with forming expectations on future accidents and their effects on
his available income. Therefore, the agent chooses his effort in accident prevention path








Agent’s preferences and effort in prevention cost functions are defined both in a wide
sense and fully individual, therefore the model sustains any kind of unobserved hetero-
geneity in these primitives of the model.
5.1.2 The testable implication
To drop the individual index is convenient for notational purposes and leaves all results
valid at the individual level irrespective of the form and degree of unobserved hetero-
geneity as mentioned above. The first result is stated in the Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1. At each t the optimal effort in accident prevention e?t , only depends on the past
history through the current premium qt.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.1. ¥
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In other words Lemma 1 states that current behavior is only affected by past acci-
dents through their impact on the incentive scheme faced by the agent, for which the
current premium contains the necessary information. Assuming a prevention technol-
ogy that does not directly depend on previous accidents disregards many ways in which
the driver’s accident history could influence his current prevention choice (e.g., learning
effects or fear after an accident).11
The program in (8) is a dynamic optimization program with state variable qt; let Vt(·)










1− p(e))[u(wt− qt)+ βVt+1(δqt)]− c(e)}.
(9)
The interest in what follows is to establish the qualitative properties of both the value
function and the optimal effort with respect to current premium, instead of finding the
optimal effort path. With that objective in mind, it is necessary to establish the relationship
between the value function and premium’s level. Lemma 2 below states that relationship.
Lemma 2. The value function Vt(·) is decreasing in qt for all t.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.3. ¥
Now, I can derive a testable implication of moral hazard under a bonus scheme that
relates current premium and optimal effort in accident prevention. To analyze the impact
of the current premium on the optimal effort lets focus on situations where the premium
is small with respect to agent’s income.13 Proposition 1 below states that for such small
levels of premium, prevention effort (or the optimal accident probability) decreases with
the premium.
Proposition 1. If the value function Vt(·) is differentiable in a neighborhood of qt = 0 for
all t, for small values of qt, the accident probability associated to optimal effort in accident
prevention pt(e?t (qt)) decreases with qt for all t.
11 Learning effects may have important consequences in the empirical test for the presence of moral hazard,
for a complete treatment of such effects see Abbring et al. (2003, Sec. 3).
12 For a detailed explanation of the argument that allows the Bellman equation representation see Appendix
C.1.2.
13 Notice that if the number of accidents is large enough, premium could exceed the agent’s current income,
current wealth or even lifetime wealth, however that situation is of no interest given that the agent could
choose stop driving and his accident probability becomes zero. In this case, accident probability does not
depend anymore on premium.
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Proof. See Appendix C.1.4. ¥
A simple testable implication is provided by Proposition 1. If moral hazard exists
under a bonus scheme, the occurrence of an accident induces an abrupt drop in the op-
timal accident probability path, hence the accident process exhibits negative occurrence
dependence.
The previous theoretical model provides a useful tool in the analysis of moral hazard
under an experience rating scheme. It was designed at the individual level and it allows
any distribution of preferences and prevention technologies across agents. However, as
long as the empirical test relies on interpersonal comparisons, the issue of unobserved
heterogeneity becomes crucial. It is also important to stress that the model does not take
into account the real fact that the bonus scheme has a floor (a fall in 10% in the premium
per year of no accidents until the 5th year). It also ignores the nonmonetary consequences
of an accident.
5.2 Empirical Analysis of Hidden Action
Based on the testable implication found in the previous section I test the presence of hid-
den action by using dynamic data on claims in a market ruled by a bonus experience rat-
ing scheme. Hence if moral hazard exists, negative occurrence dependence in the claim
process should be observed: the occurrence of an accident launches efforts in accident
prevention and reduces claims. However, policyholders in possession of hidden infor-
mation on risk could be accident–prone precisely for unobserved factors that cannot be
controlled and the test for hidden action could be deceiving. Indeed, the negative oc-
currence dependence created by hidden action and experience rating could be countered
by the positive effect on occurrence dependence produced by hidden information. The
model used here allows for the identification of occurrence dependence and controls the
deceiving unobserved heterogeneity through a survival–data model with random effects.
As the exact date of each claim is provided by the data set I follow the method pro-
posed by Abbring et al. (2003) and estimate a model of the time span between the purchase
of insurance and the first claim, and between subsequent claims using as only covariate
the number of previous claims. The estimating equation is given by (10) below:
h(t|Xi, αi) = h0(t) exp(βXi)αi, (10)
where Xi is the counting process of the number of claims and αi is a nonnegative individual–
specific effect. The multiple records structure of the data base allows a flexible parametric
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estimation method that estimate β and the frailty variance θ. The frailties are shared
among the policyholders and are assumed to follow a gamma distribution with mean
one an variance θ to be estimated from the data measuring the variability of frailty across
groups. Notice that if θ = 0 the frailty effect disappears.
Empirical implementation of the above econometric model requires to assume explicit
forms for both the baseline hazard h0(t) and a distribution of the unobserved heterogene-
ity. Following van den Berg (2001) the assumptions made over the distribution of the
unobserved heterogeneity not necessarily depends on the economic theory behind the
empirical implementation, however the explicit form of the baseline hazard should be
theoretically sustained. Here I choose the exponential form for the baseline hazard be-
cause it assumes that the failure process lack of memory which provides the adequate
environment for proving the testable implication. Notice that different assumptions on
the form of the baseline should constrain the evidence of occurrence dependence and de-
ceive the empirical test. Besides, I choose the gamma distribution for the shared frailty
component as mentioned above.
Tables 15 to 17 of Appendix C presents results after the estimation of the model above
mentioned. Column (1) presents results of a model with no shared frailty but clustered
at the individual level while column (2) to (6) presents results of models with gamma
distributed shared frailty at the individual level. Estimations in column (2) are calculated
for the entire sample while results of columns (3) and (4) are calculated from stratifying
the sample to males and females policyholders respectively. Finally columns (4) and (5)
stratify for policyholders below 25 years and above 26. In Tables 16 and 17 I present
results after stratifying for each insurance company. Below each estimation is presented
the logarithm of the shared frailty variance, the number of subjects and their fails, the
log–likelihood and finally the statistics of the log–likelihood ratio testing both the overall
significance and significance of the frailty effect (H0 : θ = 0).
If I estimate the model without unobserved heterogeneity there is no evidence of moral
hazard since an increase of one–claim increases the hazard of filing a claim in 87%, which
breaks any possibility of negative occurrence dependence. However once the unobserved
heterogeneity is controlled through the shared frailty, the estimated hazard ratio of β
drops to 0.0437 meaning a reduction of 95% of the hazard of filing a claim and sustain-
ing the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market. This result clearly
illustrates the pervasive effect of unobserved heterogeneity on the sign of occurrence de-
pendence changing it spuriously from negative to positive. The overall significance of the
model is ensured together with the significance of the frailty effect.
19
Testing for hidden information and action in automobile insurance market – J.P.GARCI´A
The sample stratification confirms in several ways the previous result and permits fur-
ther interpretations. Both males and females suffers of negative occurrence dependence
together with drivers with and without experience. In spite of the modest differences
found between females and males, females reduce more than males their hazard of filing
a claim after the occurrence of an accident. In terms of driving experience, less experi-
enced subjects reduce their hazard of filing a claim in 2% more than experienced ones,
suggesting the existence of learning effects on young drivers. The stratification for insur-
ance company reinforce the preceding conclusions and shows an interesting heterogene-
ity. While the reduction of hazard in two companies were close to 93% (Company 101 and
311), a reduction of 98% on the hazard of filing a claim is observed for company 211.
6 Conclusions
This thesis test for the identification of both hidden information and action in Colombian
car insurance market. For the identification of hidden information I apply the test pro-
posed by Finkelstein & Poterba (2006). Such test uses individual characteristics that are
not used in the pricing mechanism but correlated with both insurance coverage and risk
occurrence.
I use information on individual traffic offenses as an unused observable that is not
priced. To provide evidence of asymmetric information I show that offenses are corre-
lated with both survival probability and the amount of purchased coverage, controlling
for used variables. Since each company use different variables in the pricing mechanism
the test is conducted for each insurance company. I also provide external evidence of a
positive relationship between offenses and accidents no matter the coverage levels. That
evidence allows me to interpret previous results as supporting the presence of adverse se-
lection. I find evidence of the presence of adverse selection in six of the nine companies for
which the test is performed suggesting the inclusion of offenses variables in their pricing
mechanism in order to reduce the informational asymmetry and improve risk allocations.
For the identification of hidden action I show that bonus experience rating schemes
serves to identify the presence of moral hazard by implying negative occurrence depen-
dence for individual claim process. The major drawback of this approach appears with
the existence of intrinsically bad drivers that are more likely to be accident–prone and
to have more accidents in the future. This positive selection effect can mislead the neg-
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ative occurrence effect and hence deceive the test for moral hazard. I build on the work
of Abbring et al. (2003) that deals with both the statistical identification of the parame-
ter measuring negative dependence and the empirical distinction between unobserved
heterogeneity that causes the positive selection effect and the negative state dependence
caused by moral hazard. Using a parametric survival model with shared frailty I show the
existence of negative occurrence dependence and hence of moral hazard in the Colombian
insurance market. Stratified analysis on males and females and on experienced and not
experienced drivers confirm previous result. Finally, analysis for each insurance company
reinforces the previous results and suggest the need for modifications on the deductible
mechanism applied by the insurance companies.
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A Colombian Car Insurance Market: Appendix
Table 2: Variables available in the data set
Variable Value label Description
ph start date policy start date
ph sex 0 male sex
1 female
ph age age










ph offenses num number of offenses
ph offenses mw number of minimum
wages charged
c brand car brand
c model car model (year)
c alarm 0 no alarm car with alarm
1 alarm
c locator 0 no locator car with locator
1 locator
c class car class
c weight car weight (in Kg)
c imported 0 national national or imported car
1 imported
c power car power (in HP)
c ec car engine capacity (in c3)
c pcapacity car passenger capacity
c lcapacity car load capacity
c doors number of car doors
c air 0 no car air system
1 yes
c gearbox 0 Mec car type of gearbox
1 Aut
c fueltype 0 Gas car fuel type
1 Diesel




p bonus bonus %
p coverage policy coverage
cl date accident date
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Table 3: Variables used in the pricing mechanism by company
Company
Variable 101 161 311 351 381 431 441 451 501
Sex N N N Y N Y Y N N
Age N N Y Y Y Y Y N N
Occupation N N Y N Y N Y N N
Marital Status N N Y N N N N N N
Brand Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Model Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Alarm N Y Y N Y N Y N N
Locator Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Class N N Y N N N N N Y
Weight Y Y N N N N Y Y N
Imported Y Y Y N N N N Y N
Power N Y N N N N Y N N
c3 N Y N N N N N N N
P Capacity N Y N N N N Y N Y
L Capacity N Y N N N Y Y N Y
Doors N Y N N Y N Y N N
Air N Y N N Y N N N N
Gearbox N Y N N Y N N N N
Gas N Y N N Y N N N N
Train N Y N N Y N Y N Y
Note: Pricing information provided by insurance companies through Fasecolda. A N means that the company do
not use that variable in its pricing mechanism while a Y means that it is used.
Table 4: Description of the survival data set
Per subject
Category Total Mean Min Median Max
no. of subjects 236582
(first) entry time Jul/12/2006 Jan/01/2006 Jul/18/2006 Dec/01/2006
(final) exit time Jul/12/2007 Jan/01/2007 Jul/18/2007 Dec/01/2007
subjects with gap 0
time at risk 86352430 365 365 365 365
failures 12894 .0545012 0 0 5
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Source: Fasecolda & own calculations.
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B Identification of Hidden Information: Appendix
Table 5: Correlation between traffic offenses and accidents
Accidents
With Insurance Without Insurance
Number of offenses 0.6041 0.5014
(0.0480) (0.047)
Minimum wages charged 0.5836 0.4863
(0.0495) (0.0469)
Note: Pairwise correlation coefficients between the offense variables and the number of accidents. Coefficients
obtained from an extended database with subjects with and without insurance contracts. P-values displayed in
parenthesis.
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Note for Tables 6 to 14: Coefficients in columns (1) to (3) are from Cox proportional hazard model of time spans
between insurance purchase and subsequent claims (equation 4). In order to interpret coefficients from Cox re-
gression as hazard ratios they must be exponentiated. Coefficients in columns (4) to (6) are from OLS models
of log–coverage (equation 5). Additional to the coefficients shown in the table, all models use as covariates the
policyholder information used by the pricing mechanism. Standard errors clustered at the number of claims are
shown in parenthesis. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
Table 6: Model comparison company 101
Cox Cox Num Cox MW OLS OLS Num OLS MW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Time spans Log-Coverage
Model .0527* .0521* .0521* .0776* .0775* .0775*
(.00426) (.00426) (.00426) (.00031) (.00031) (.00031)
No. offenses .144* .0236*
(.019) (.00206)
No. min. wages offenses .00866* .00133*
(.00107) (.00012)
Cons -139* -138* -138*
(.63) (.629) (.629)
N 50162 50162 50162 47009 47009 47009
No. of subjects 47009 47009 47009
No. of fails 3153 3153 3153
Log lik. -30865 -30842 -30839 -15459 -15394 -15395
Pseudo r2 .00503 .00578 .00589
LR chi2 312 359 365
Prob LR 8.7e-51 1.1e-59 6.0e-61
Prop. Hazdrs. Test 27.8 28.8 28.5
Prob P.H. Test .366 .372 .387
Adjusted r2 .667 .668 .668
F 3617 3497 3497
Prob F 2.7e-42 1.1e-43 1.1e-43
Note: For a detailed information of the estimation procedure see the note of page 29.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
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Table 7: Model comparison company 161
Cox Cox Num Cox MW OLS OLS Num OLS MW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Time spans Log-Coverage
Model .0233+ .0221+ .0221+ .0779* .0779* .0779*
(.00992) (.00994) (.00993) (.00048) (.00048) (.00048)
No. offenses .17* .0096*
(.0367) (.00277)
No. min. wages offenses .00948* .00045*
(.00219) (.00016)
Cons -140* -140* -140*
(.956) (.956) (.956)
N 16525 16525 16525 15750 15750 15750
No. of subjects 15750 15750 15750
No. of fails 775 775 775
Log lik. -6908 -6900 -6901 981 987 985
Pseudo r2 .0028 .00396 .00384
LR chi2 38.8 54.9 53.3
Prob LR .223 .013 .0188
Prop. Hazdrs. Test 33.7 33.9 34.4
Prob P.H. Test .433 .471 .45
Adjusted r2 .83 .83 .83
F 2334 2267 2267
Prob F 3.9e-50 2.1e-51 2.1e-51
Note: For a detailed information of the estimation procedure see the note of page 29.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
Table 8: Model comparison company 311
Cox Cox Num Cox MW OLS OLS Num OLS MW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Time spans Log-Coverage
Model .0838* .0839* .0839* .0788* .0788* .0787*
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.00136) (.00136) (.00136)
No. offenses -.0375 .0131-
(.0901) (.00754)
No. min. wages offenses -.00118 .00094+
(.00513) (.00044)
Cons -141* -141* -141*
(2.73) (2.73) (2.73)
N 2362 2362 2362 2133 2133 2133
No. of subjects 2133 2133 2133
No. of fails 229 229 229
Log lik. -1555 -1555 -1555 -273 -271 -270
Pseudo r2 .0145 .0146 .0145
LR chi2 45.8 46 45.8
Prob LR .00472 .0065 .00673
Prop. Hazdrs. Test 26.9 27.6 27
Prob P.H. Test .31 .328 .357
Adjusted r2 .69 .69 .69
F 199 191 191
Prob F 5.0e-24 9.4e-25 9.2e-25
Note: For a detailed information of the estimation procedure see the note of page 29.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
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Table 9: Model comparison company 351
Cox Cox Num Cox MW OLS OLS Num OLS MW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Time spans Log-Coverage
Model .0496* .0478* .0483* .0846* .0845* .0845*
(.015) (.015) (.015) (.00099) (.00098) (.00098)
No. offenses .223* .0245*
(.0575) (.00664)
No. min. wages offenses .0112* .00144*
(.00335) (.00037)
Cons -152* -152* -152*
(1.97) (1.97) (1.97)
N 5968 5968 5968 5681 5681 5681
No. of subjects 5681 5681 5681
No. of fails 287 287 287
Log lik. -2232 -2226 -2227 -1765 -1758 -1757
Pseudo r2 .00856 .0111 .0105
LR chi2 38.5 50 47.2
Prob LR .0159 .00092 .00209
Prop. Hazdrs. Test 18.6 19.9 18.9
Prob P.H. Test .671 .645 .707
Adjusted r2 .615 .616 .616
F 413 397 397
Prob F 1.2e-25 1.5e-26 1.5e-26
Note: For a detailed information of the estimation procedure see the note of page 29.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
Table 10: Model comparison company 381
Cox Cox Num Cox MW OLS OLS Num OLS MW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Time spans Log-Coverage
Model .0266 .0264 .0264 .0715* .0715* .0715*
(.0211) (.0211) (.0211) (.00124) (.00124) (.00124)
No. offenses .0473 .013+
(.101) (.00612)
No. min. wages offenses .00261 .00053
(.00552) (.00034)
Cons -126* -126* -126*
(2.49) (2.49) (2.49)
N 2847 2847 2847 2679 2679 2679
No. of subjects 2679 2679 2679
No. of fails 168 168 168
Log lik. -1164 -1164 -1164 -113 -111 -112
Pseudo r2 .00817 .00826 .00826
LR chi2 19.2 19.4 19.4
Prob LR .864 .886 .886
Prop. Hazdrs. Test 27.9 28.9 28.6
Prob P.H. Test .414 .419 .434
Adjusted r2 .754 .754 .754
F 305 295 294
Prob F 2.3e-29 3.5e-30 3.6e-30
Note: For a detailed information of the estimation procedure see the note of page 29.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
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Table 11: Model comparison company 431
Cox Cox Num Cox MW OLS OLS Num OLS MW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Time spans Log-Coverage
Model .0364* .0359* .0361* .0883* .0881* .0881*
(.00974) (.00974) (.00974) (.00061) (.00061) (.00061)
No. offenses .112- .0189*
(.0572) (.00402)
No. min. wages offenses .00312 .00096*
(.00348) (.00023)
Cons -160* -159* -159*
(1.21) (1.21) (1.21)
N 10140 10140 10140 9648 9648 9648
No. of subjects 9648 9648 9648
No. of fails 492 492 492
Log lik. -4094 -4092 -4093 -1519 -1508 -1511
Pseudo r2 .00634 .00675 .00643
LR chi2 52.2 55.6 53
Prob LR .00112 .00063 .00136
Prop. Hazdrs. Test 26.6 27.8 27.7
Prob P.H. Test .375 .371 .373
Adjusted r2 .738 .739 .739
F 1089 1050 1049
Prob F 3.3e-34 2.6e-35 2.6e-35
Note: For a detailed information of the estimation procedure see the note of page 29.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
Table 12: Model comparison company 441
Cox Cox Num Cox MW OLS OLS Num OLS MW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Time spans Log-Coverage
Model .0435+ .0434+ .0434+ .0558* .0558* .0558*
(.0179) (.0179) (.0179) (.00047) (.00047) (.00047)
No. offenses .036 .00937+
(.145) (.00426)
No. min. wages offenses .00167 .00034
(.00795) (.00022)
Cons -95* -95* -95*
(.95) (.949) (.95)
N 4595 4595 4595 4408 4408 4408
No. of subjects 4408 4408 4408
No. of fails 187 187 187
Log lik. -1407 -1407 -1407 2341 2344 2342
Pseudo r2 .0115 .0115 .0115
LR chi2 32.6 32.7 32.7
Prob LR .209 .247 .248
Prop. Hazdrs. Test 19.2 19.3 19.5
Prob P.H. Test .864 .888 .883
Adjusted r2 .874 .874 .874
F 1132 1093 1092
Prob F 4.8e-37 3.8e-38 3.8e-38
Note: For a detailed information of the estimation procedure see the note of page 29.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
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Table 13: Model comparison company 451
Cox Cox Num Cox MW OLS OLS Num OLS MW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Time spans Log-Coverage
Model .0434* .0429* .0429* .103* .103* .103*
(.00489) (.00489) (.00489) (.00098) (.00098) (.00098)
No. offenses .0919* .0111
(.0307) (.00845)
No. min. wages offenses .00503* .00086-
(.00172) (.00047)
Cons -189* -189* -189*
(1.95) (1.96) (1.96)
N 33001 33001 33001 31186 31186 31186
No. of subjects 31186 31186 31186
No. of fails 1815 1815 1815
Log lik. -17285 -17281 -17282 -45375 -45374 -45373
Pseudo r2 .00408 .00431 .0043
LR chi2 142 150 149
Prob LR 6.6e-18 5.7e-19 6.6e-19
Prop. Hazdrs. Test 16.2 18.9 19.8
Prob P.H. Test .932 .875 .838
Adjusted r2 .309 .309 .309
F 536 516 517
Prob F 1.6e-31 1.8e-32 1.8e-32
Note: For a detailed information of the estimation procedure see the note of page 29.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
Table 14: Model comparison company 501
Cox Cox Num Cox MW OLS OLS Num OLS MW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Time spans Log-Coverage
Model .0612* .0603* .0601* .084* .0839* .0839*
(.0108) (.0108) (.0108) (.00075) (.00075) (.00075)
No. offenses .153* .00997-
(.0445) (.00548)
No. min. wages offenses .01* .00058-
(.00282) (.00032)
Cons -151* -151* -151*
(1.5) (1.5) (1.5)
N 7275 7275 7275 6871 6871 6871
No. of subjects 6871 6871 6871
No. of fails 404 404 404
Log lik. -3197 -3193 -3192 -2127 -2126 -2126
Pseudo r2 .00946 .0107 .0109
LR chi2 61.1 68.9 70.1
Prob LR 2.7e-05 3.2e-06 2.1e-06
Prop. Hazdrs. Test 16.5 16.8 16.8
Prob P.H. Test .833 .857 .857
Adjusted r2 .677 .677 .677
F 626 600 600
Prob F 8.0e-29 8.6e-30 8.6e-30
Note: For a detailed information of the estimation procedure see the note of page 29.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
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C Identification of Hidden Action: Appendix
C.1 Dynamic Moral Hazard under a Bonus Scheme
C.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma. At each t the optimal effort in accident prevention e?t , only depends on the past
history through the current premium qt.





u(wt − d− qt)− u(w− qt)
]− c′(et) = 0[






Given the assumptions over c′(·) and p′(·), ∆(·) is increasing and has an inverse and
hence there exists an optimal effort in accident prevention e?t that depends on the past
only through the premium qt defined by (6). ¥
C.1.2 Bellman Equation Argument
As the premium is the state variable of the problem, the state space is named Q ⊂ R+.
The effort in accident prevention is the control variable, hence the action space is named
E = [0, e¯]. Let vt be the period–t reward function which is continuous over Q × E and
given that u′′(·) < 0, is bounded on Q× E. Let qt+1 defined by (6) be the period–t transi-
tion function which is continuous on Q× E. Finally, let Φt(q) : Q ⇒ ℘(E) be the period–t
feasible action correspondence. As the problem does not impose any restriction on the ac-
tion space, Φt(·) is continuous on Q and compact valued. Given this, the problem satisfies
the Bellman Principle of Optimality, and accepts the Bellman Equation representation.
C.1.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma. The value function Vt(·) is decreasing in qt for all t.
Proof. By mathematical induction. Starting in T, for any q′ < q, let p(·)′ and p(·) denote
the respective accident probability associated to optimal effort in accident prevention for
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each q′ and q.
VT(q′) = p(e)′u(wT − d− q′T) + (1− p(e)′)u(wT − q′T)− c(e)
≥ p(e)u(wT − d− q′T) + (1− p(e))u(wT − q′T)− c(e)
≥ p(e)u(wT − d− qT) + (1− p(e))u(wT − qT)− c(e)
= VT(q)
Now assume that Vt+1(q) is decreasing; by backward induction, for any q′ < q:
Vt(q′) ≥ p(e)
[
u(wt − d− q′t) + βVt+1(q′t)
]
+ (1− p(e))[u(wt − q′t) + βVt+1(δq′t)]− c(e)
≥ p(e)[u(wt − d− qt) + βVt+1(qt)]+ (1− p(e))[u(wt − qt) + βVt+1(δqt)]− c(e)
= Vt(q)
And Vt(·) is also decreasing. ¥
C.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition. If the value function Vt(·) is differentiable in a neighborhood of qt = 0 for
all t, for small values of qt, the accident probability associated to optimal effort in accident
prevention pt(e?t (qt)) decreases with qt for all t.




u(wt − qt) + βVt+1(δqt)+
p(e)
[
u(wt − d− qt)− u(wt − qt) + βVt+1(qt)− βVt+1(δqt)
]− c(e)}.
Notice that as assumed before u′(·) > 0, and as stated in Lemma 2, Vt+1(·) is decreasing
in q; given this, the maximand is concave in e and the first order approach is sufficient.
The optimal effort in accident prevention at qt satisfies:
c′(e?t (qt))
p′(e?t (qt))















= u′(wt − qt)− u′(wt − d− qt) + β
[
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′(wt)− u′(wt − d) + β(1− δ)V ′t+1(0)
p′(e?t (0))c′′(e?t (0))−p′′(e?t (0))c′(e?t (0))
p′(e?t (0))2
> 0.
Finally, by the chain rule dpdq =
dp
de · dedq and given the assumptions over dpde , it is possible to
conclude that dpdq < 0. ¥
C.2 Empirical Analysis of Hidden Action
Table 15: Testing for the presence of moral hazard
Cluster Frailty Frailty Sex=0 Frailty Sex=1 Frailty Age≤25 Frailty Age>26
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Time spans
No. of Claims .628* -3.13* -3.06* -3.2* -3.7* -3.12*
(.0289) (.039) (.0581) (.0675) (.283) (.0393)
Cons -8.84* -7.75* -7.75* -7.63* -7.11* -7.76*
(.00917) (.0209) (.0313) (.0382) (.155) (.0211)
ln(θ) 3.6* 3.53* 3.66* 3.45* 3.6*
(.0179) (.0275) (.0305) (.111) (.0182)
N 249476 249476 106717 76371 3686 245790
No. of subjects 2.4e+05 2.4e+05 1.0e+05 72344 3425 2.3e+05
No. of fails 12894 12894 5713 4027 261 12633
Log lik. -671 1483 824 656 137 1363
LR chi2 472 3990 1673 1434 129 3867
Prob LR 1.e-104 0 0 0 6.8e-30 0
θ = 0 36.5 34.3 38.8 31.5 36.6
LR Chi2 θ = 0 4309 1816 1547 133 4181
Prob LR θ = 0 0 0 0 5.6e-31 0
Note: Coefficients are from exponential hazard model of time spans between insurance purchase and subsequent
claims (equation 10). Column (1) assumes that the frailty effect have variance zero and present standard errors
clustered at individual level. Columns (2) to (6) are from exponential hazard models with individual shared frailty
gamma distributed. In order to interpret coefficients from exponential regression as hazard ratios they must be
exponentiated. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
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Table 16: Testing for the presence of moral hazard
Frailty 101 Frailty 151 Frailty 161 Frailty 211 Frailty 311 Frailty 351
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Time spans
No. of Claims -2.72* -3.22* -3.02* -4.36* -2.71* -2.91*
(.0699) (.107) (.153) (.22) (.187) (.11)
Cons -7.57* -7.83* -8.01* -8.08* -7.13* -7.7*
(.0429) (.0542) (.0759) (.0813) (.109) (.0621)
ln(θ) 3.41* 3.61* 3.57* 4.12* 2.82* 3.5*
(.0368) (.0477) (.0734) (.0643) (.1) (.0543)
N 50349 37960 19869 25296 4711 25939
No. of subjects 47184 36087 18944 24464 4242 24482
No. of fails 3165 1873 925 832 469 1457
Log lik. 1032 110 -30.7 -263 371 291
LR chi2 885 571 221 363 128 419
Prob LR 2.e-194 3.e-126 4.8e-50 6.4e-81 1.3e-29 4.4e-93
θ = 0 30.2 37 35.5 61.9 16.8 33
LR Chi2 θ = 0 1002 610 240 368 137 464
Prob LR θ = 0 3.e-220 4.e-135 2.5e-54 2.5e-82 5.0e-32 4.e-103
Note: Coefficients are from exponential hazard model of time spans between insurance purchase
and subsequent claims (equation 10) with individual shared frailty gamma distributed. Statisti-
cal significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+) and (-) respectively.
Table 17: Testing for the presence of moral hazard
Frailty 381 Frailty 431 Frailty 441 Frailty 451 Frailty 501
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Time spans
No. of Claims -3.52* -3.72* -3.56* -3.39* -3.41*
(.219) (.193) (.192) (.112) (.208)
Cons -7.42* -7.65* -8.24* -7.66* -7.62*
(.113) (.096) (.0829) (.0563) (.109)
ln(θ) 3.5* 3.81* 3.92* 3.53* 3.62*
(.0889) (.0731) (.0758) (.0477) (.088)
N 7282 13195 22378 33261 9236
No. of subjects 6835 12569 21598 31435 8742
No. of fails 447 626 780 1826 494
Log lik. 150 48.9 -244 321 83.9
LR chi2 186 277 232 601 180
Prob LR 2.5e-42 3.8e-62 2.2e-52 1.e-132 5.4e-41
θ = 0 33.3 45 50.4 34.2 37.4
LR Chi2 θ = 0 193 286 245 630 191
Prob LR θ = 0 3.1e-44 1.6e-64 1.3e-55 2.e-139 1.1e-43
Note: Coefficients are from exponential hazard model of time spans between insurance
purchase and subsequent claims (equation 10) with individual shared frailty gamma
distributed. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are displayed by (*), (+)
and (-) respectively.
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